论文标题
扣留可验证的信息
Withholding Verifiable Information
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了一类可验证的披露游戏，其中发件人的收益是独立的，而接收者的最佳措施仅取决于预期的状态。发件人的消息是可以验证的，因为它们可能含糊，但永远不会错。发件人的首选平衡是什么？发件人什么时候从拥有承诺能力中获得的？我将信息设计结果的条件确定为可验证的披露游戏的平衡结果，并提供简单的条件，在该条件下，发件人不会从承诺能力中受益。这些结果有助于表征发件人首选的平衡和她在一类可验证的披露游戏中设定的平衡收益。我将这些见解应用于影响选民的影响和质量披露。
I study a class of verifiable disclosure games where the sender's payoff is state independent and the receiver's optimal action only depends on the expected state. The sender's messages are verifiable in the sense that they can be vague but can never be wrong. What is the sender's preferred equilibrium? When does the sender gain nothing from having commitment power? I identify conditions for an information design outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the verifiable disclosure game, and give simple sufficient conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. These results help in characterizing the sender's preferred equilibria and her equilibrium payoff set in a class of verifiable disclosure games. I apply these insights to study influencing voters and selling with quality disclosure.
