论文标题
疫苗接种行为的共同进化和感知的疫苗接种风险可能会导致像游戏一样的陷阱
Co-evolution of Vaccination Behavior and Perceived Vaccination Risk can lead to a Stag-Hunt like Game
论文作者
论文摘要
自愿疫苗接种可有效防止传染病扩散。疫苗接种行为和对疫苗接种风险的认知在个人疫苗接种决策中起着重要作用。但是，目前尚不清楚这两种共同进化如何形成范围内的疫苗接种行为。我们建立了三种不同时间尺度的流行病，疫苗接种行为和感知疫苗接种风险的耦合动力学。我们假设疫苗接种水平的增加抑制了感知到的疫苗接种风险的增加，而感知到的疫苗接种风险的增加抑制了疫苗接种水平的上升。结果表明，只要基本的生殖比率是中等的并且流行动力学的发展迅速，则最终的疫苗接种行为与Stag-Hunt游戏类似。这与先前的观点相反，即疫苗接种是像雪花一样的游戏。此外，我们发现流行病反复爆发，如果这三种动态在类似的时间尺度演变，则最终导致疫苗恐惧。我们提出了一些促进疫苗接种行为的方法，例如控制副作用偏见和感知的疫苗接种成本。我们的工作通过考虑认知和行为的共同进化动态来阐明通过疫苗接种的流行控制。
Voluntary vaccination is effective to prevent infectious diseases from spreading. Both vaccination behavior and cognition of the vaccination risk play important roles in individual vaccination decision making. However, it is not clear how the co-evolution of the two shapes the population-wide vaccination behavior. We establish a coupled dynamics of epidemic, vaccination behavior and perceived vaccination risk with three different time scales. We assume that the increase of vaccination level inhibits the rise of perceived vaccination risk, and the increase of perceived vaccination risk inhibits the rise of vaccination level. It is shown that the resulting vaccination behavior is similar to the stag-hunt game, provided that the basic reproductive ratio is moderate and that the epidemic dynamics evolves fast. This is in contrast with the previous view that vaccination is a snowdrift like game. Furthermore, we find that epidemic breaks out repeatedly and eventually leads to vaccine scares if these three dynamics evolve on a similar time scale. And we propose some ways to promote vaccination behavior, such as controlling side-effect bias and perceived vaccination costs. Our work sheds light on epidemic control via vaccination by taking into account the co-evolutionary dynamics of cognition and behavior.
