论文标题
合理性的信息设计：在数量响应下的贝叶斯说服
Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response
论文作者
论文摘要
经典机制/信息设计施加了以下假设：代理是完全合理的，这意味着每个人总是选择最大化她的预期效用的动作。然而，许多经验证据表明，人类的决定可能会偏离这种完全理性的假设。在这项工作中，我们试图以有限的理性来放松整个理性假设。具体而言，我们通过采用量化响应模型来提出代理的有限合理性（McKelvey and Palfrey，1995）。 我们在贝叶斯说服的规范环境（Kamenica and Gentzkow，2011年）中开发了一种理性的信息设计理论。我们首先确定完全理性接收器的最佳信号传导方案结构在有限理性的接收器中保持最佳或大致最佳。在实践中，设计师估计接收者有限的理性水平的程度可能是昂贵的。在这种实际考虑的过程中，当我们对接收者的有限理性水平不确定性时，我们研究了强大信号方案的存在和构建。
Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may deviate from this full rationality assumption. In this work, we attempt to relax the full rationality assumption with bounded rationality. Specifically, we formulate the bounded rationality of an agent by adopting the quantal response model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). We develop a theory of rationality-robust information design in the canonical setting of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) with binary receiver action. We first identify conditions under which the optimal signaling scheme structure for a fully rational receiver remains optimal or approximately optimal for a boundedly rational receiver. In practice, it might be costly for the designer to estimate the degree of the receiver's bounded rationality level. Motivated by this practical consideration, we then study the existence and construction of robust signaling schemes when there is uncertainty about the receiver's bounded rationality level.
