论文标题
最佳利用第三方需求响应资源在垂直集成的实用程序中：游戏理论方法
Optimal Utilization of Third-Party Demand Response Resources in Vertically Integrated Utilities: A Game Theoretic Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了垂直集成的实用程序的最佳机制，以派遣和激励其领土上的第三方需求响应（DR）提供商。提出了一个框架，其中包含三层耦合的Stackelberg和同时游戏，以研究公用事业公司寻求利润过程，第三方DR DR提供商以及DR计划中的个人最终用户（EUS）之间的互动和竞争。提出了两个带有三层结构的耦合单领导者 - 型 - 型固定器游戏，以捕获实用程序之间的相互作用（在上层建模），第三方DR DR提供商（在中间层中建模）和每个DR程序中的EUS（在下层建模）。每个DR计划中EUS之间的比赛都是通过非合作性同时游戏来捕获的。提出了不便的成本功能，以模拟不同EUS的DR提供意愿和能力。中层DR提供商和低层EUS之间的Stackelberg游戏通过将原始的双层编程转换为单级节目编程来解决。该转换后的单层编程嵌入到迭代算法中，以求解整个耦合游戏框架。对IEEE 34-BUS和IEEE 69-BUS测试系统进行了案例研究，以说明所提出的框架的应用。
This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for the vertically integrated utility to dispatch and incentivize the third-party demand response (DR) providers in its territory. A framework is proposed, with three-layer coupled Stackelberg and simultaneous games, to study the interactions and competitions among the profit-seeking process of the utility, the third-party DR providers, and the individual end users (EUs) in the DR programs. Two coupled single-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg games with a three-layer structure are proposed to capture the interactions among the utility (modeled in the upper layer), the third-party DR providers (modeled in the middle layer), and the EUs in each DR program (modeled in the lower layer). The competitions among the EUs in each DR program is captured through a non-cooperative simultaneous game. An inconvenience cost function is proposed to model the DR provision willingness and capacity of different EUs. The Stackelberg game between the middle-layer DR provider and the lower-layer EUs is solved by converting the original bi-level programming to a singlelevel programming. This converted single-level programming is embedded in an iterative algorithm toward solving the entire coupled games framework. Case studies are performed on IEEE 34-bus and IEEE 69-bus test systems to illustrate the application of the proposed framework.
