论文标题
大规模退出攻击在闪电网络上
Mass Exit Attacks on the Lightning Network
论文作者
论文摘要
近年来,Lightning Network(LN)的增长迅速,并且已成为比特币区块链最受欢迎的扩展解决方案。 LN的安全性取决于节点通过解决余额来关闭频道的能力,这需要在预先验证的时间段内确认比特币区块链上的交易。在较小的对抗性节点联盟的情况下,我们研究LN对大规模退出攻击的敏感性,迫使大量诚实用户与区块链互动。我们专注于两种攻击:(i)第一个是僵尸攻击,其中一组K节点变得无反应,目的是将许多渠道的资金锁定一段时间的时间比LN协议所指示的时间更长。 (ii)第二个是质量双重攻击,其中一组K节点试图通过提交许多使用过期协议状态结算渠道的交易来窃取资金;这导致许多诚实的节点必须通过提交无效的交易来迅速做出回应。我们通过模拟显示,在历史上合理的拥塞条件下,具有对渠道余额的轻度统计假设,这两种攻击都可以由一个很小的联盟进行。为了执行我们的模拟,我们制定了一个问题的问题,即发现k对逆性节点的最坏情况是切割问题。我们的实验发现得到了基于LN的无规模拓扑的理论理由的支持。
The Lightning Network (LN) has enjoyed rapid growth over recent years, and has become the most popular scaling solution for the Bitcoin blockchain. The security of the LN relies on the ability of the nodes to close a channel by settling their balances, which requires confirming a transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain within a pre-agreed time period. We study the susceptibility of the LN to mass exit attacks in case of high transaction congestion, in the presence of a small coalition of adversarial nodes that forces a large set of honest users to interact with the blockchain. We focus on two types of attacks: (i) The first is a zombie attack, where a set of k nodes become unresponsive with the goal of locking the funds of many channels for a period of time longer than what the LN protocol dictates. (ii) The second is a mass double-spend attack, where a set of k nodes attempt to steal funds by submitting many closing transactions that settle channels using expired protocol states; this causes many honest nodes to have to quickly respond by submitting invalidating transactions. We show via simulations that, under historically plausible congestion conditions, with mild statistical assumptions on channel balances, both attacks can be performed by a very small coalition. To perform our simulations, we formulate the problem of finding a worst-case coalition of k adversarial nodes as a graph cut problem. Our experimental findings are supported by theoretical justifications based on the scale-free topology of the LN.