论文标题
数据可用性委员会的加密经济安全
Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees
论文作者
论文摘要
第2层系统由于其扩展L1区块链的吞吐量的潜力而受到了越来越多的关注。为了避免将数据放在链上的成本，这些系统越来越多地转向链链数据可用性解决方案，例如数据可用性委员会（DACS）。但是，对DACS的信任与获得安全性仅依赖于L1链的L2体系结构的目标发生冲突。为了消除这种信任假设，我们提出了一个DAC协议，该协议提供了经济激励措施，以阻止DAC节点从对抗性行为中，例如应要求扣留数据。然后，我们将理性的DAC节点和客户的相互作用与拜占庭对手进行动态游戏分析，该游戏可能会腐败并贿赂参与者。我们还为DAC协议定义了最佳概念，灵感来自公平和经济可行性。我们的主要结果表明，我们的协议是最佳的，并保证在对手的合理假设下具有最高概率的安全性。
Layer 2 systems have received increasing attention due to their potential to scale the throughput of L1 blockchains. To avoid the cost of putting data on chain, these systems increasingly turn to off-chain data availability solutions such as data availability committees (DACs). However, placing trust on DACs conflicts with the goal of obtaining an L2 architecture whose security relies solely on the L1 chain. To eliminate such trust assumptions, we propose a DAC protocol that provides financial incentives to deter the DAC nodes from adversarial behavior such as withholding data upon request. We then analyze the interaction of rational DAC nodes and clients as a dynamic game, with a Byzantine adversary that can corrupt and bribe the participants. We also define a notion of optimality for the DAC protocols, inspired by fairness and economic feasibility. Our main result shows that our protocol is optimal and guarantees security with the highest possible probability under reasonable assumptions on the adversary.
