论文标题
昂贵的证据和酌处披露
Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure
论文作者
论文摘要
发件人灵活地获取证据 - 她可以向第三方支付证明 - 向接收者披露。当明显的证据获取时，接收者观察到证据收集过程，无论其结果是否获得认证。当收购被掩盖时，接收器不会。与外源证据相反，接收者更喜欢严格的正认证成本。随着收购成本的消失，平衡会融合到帕累托敏感的自由学习均衡。接收者始终更喜欢秘密秘密，而不是公开的证据获取。
A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is certified. When acquisition is covert, the receiver does not. In contrast to the case with exogenous evidence, the receiver prefers a strictly positive certification cost. As acquisition costs vanish, equilibria converge to the Pareto-worst free-learning equilibrium. The receiver always prefers covert to overt evidence acquisition.
