论文标题
多个不完整信息的多阶段游戏中的认知层次结构：理论与实验
Cognitive Hierarchies in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiment
论文作者
论文摘要
顺序平衡是分析不完整信息的多阶段游戏的常规方法。它依赖于信念的相互一致性。为了放松相互的一致性，我在理论上和实验上探索了动态认知层次结构（DCH）解决方案。 DCH的一个属性是，解决方案可以在两个不同的游戏之间有所不同，共享相同的降低正常形式，即在战略等价方面违反不变性。我在实验室实验中使用两个具有战略性等效版本的肮脏面孔游戏测试了这一预测。按照DCH的预测，对游戏参数进行了校准，以最大程度地提高两个版本之间行为的预期差异。实验结果表明，两种版本之间的行为显着差异，更重要的是，观察到的差异与DCH一致。这表明以降低的正常形式实施动态游戏实验（使用“策略方法”）可能会导致行为扭曲。
Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consistency, I theoretically and experimentally explore the dynamic cognitive hierarchy (DCH) solution. One property of DCH is that the solution can vary between two different games sharing the same reduced normal form, i.e., violation of invariance under strategic equivalence. I test this prediction in a laboratory experiment using two strategically equivalent versions of the dirty-faces game. The game parameters are calibrated to maximize the expected difference in behavior between the two versions, as predicted by DCH. The experimental results indicate significant differences in behavior between the two versions, and more importantly, the observed differences align with DCH. This suggests that implementing a dynamic game experiment in reduced normal form (using the "strategy method") could lead to distortions in behavior.
