论文标题
间接排除可以促进重复组相互作用的合作
Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions
论文作者
论文摘要
社会排斥被认为是促进合作发展的最有效措施之一。在真实的社会中，社会排斥工作的方式可以直接或间接。但是，到目前为止，尚无相关工作可以探讨间接排除从理论的角度影响合作的演变。在这里，我们将间接排除在重复的公共物品游戏中介绍，游戏组织者在第一轮比赛后可能会选择合作者，以参加以下可能的游戏互动。然后，我们研究了无限和有限混杂人群中合作的进化动力学。通过理论分析和数值计算，我们发现间接排除的引入可以诱导合作者和缺陷的稳定共存或合作者的主导地位，从而有效地促进了合作的演变。此外，我们表明，当组织者的价值低于中间价值时，组织者的识别概率对公共合作具有非线性影响，而较高的识别概率可以维持高水平的合作。此外，我们的结果表明，增加游戏互动的平均回合可以有效地促进合作的演变。
Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote the evolution of cooperation. In real society, the way in which social exclusion works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work to explore how indirect exclusion influences the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we introduce indirect exclusion into the repeated public goods game where the game organizer probabilistically selects cooperators after the first game round to participate in the following possible game interactions. We then investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation both in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we find that the introduction of indirect exclusion can induce the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors or the dominance of cooperators, which thus effectively promotes the evolution of cooperation. Besides, we show that the identifying probability of the organizer has a nonlinear effect on public cooperation when its value is lower than an intermediate value, while the higher identifying probability can maintain a high level of cooperation. Furthermore, our results show that increasing the average rounds of game interactions can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation.
