论文标题
（随机）否决权代表团的最佳性
The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation
论文作者
论文摘要
假设后者具有国家独立的偏好，我们分析了主体和代理之间的最佳委托问题。我们证明，如果主体比对非地位Quo选项的代理更避免风险，那么最佳机制就是{\ em veto机制}。在否决权机制中，主体使用否决权（即维持现状）来平衡代理的激励措施，并且不会在非地位QUO选项之间随机化。我们在一维环境中表征了最佳的否决机制。在解决方案中，仅当状态超过临界阈值时，本金才能使用否决权。
We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options, an optimal mechanism is a {\em veto mechanism}. In a veto mechanism, the principal uses veto (i.e., maintaining the status quo) to balance the agent's incentives and does not randomize among non-status quo options. We characterize the optimal veto mechanism in a one-dimensional setting. In the solution, the principal uses veto only when the state surpasses a critical threshold.
