论文标题
在结构化的多翼批准选举中，贿赂可能会变得越来越困难
Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了结构化多翼批准选举的建设性贿赂的复杂性。鉴于这样的选举，我们询问某个候选人是否可以通过添加，删除或交换批准来加入获奖委员会，在此操作以损失为代价，我们受预算的限制。我们假设选举具有候选间隔或选民间隔财产，我们要求该财产在贿赂之后也要持有。尽管结构化的选举通常使操纵攻击变得非常容易，但我们的工作也显示了相反行为的例子。我们结论是通过提供有关问题的破坏性变体的初步见解。
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval or the voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after the bribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attacks significantly easier, our work also shows examples of the opposite behavior. We conclude by presenting preliminary insights regarding the destructive variant of our problem.
