论文标题
延期接受的市场设计：决策秘诀
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一种从制度选择规则（或优先级规则）的表征来得出的方法，这是基于这些选择规则的大风 - 夏普利延期延期接受（DA）匹配规则的特征。我们将我们的方法应用于智利的学校选择，在那里我们为与学校包容法唯一兼容的学校设计了选择规则，并得出了一套与法律兼容的匹配属性，这些属性基于设计的选择规则来表征DA规则。我们的方法提供了建立此类结果的秘诀，并可以帮助决策者决定在实践中使用哪种分配规则。
We introduce a method to derive from a characterization of institutional choice rules (or priority rules), a characterization of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) matching rule based on these choice rules. We apply our method to school choice in Chile, where we design choice rules for schools that are uniquely compatible with the School Inclusion Law and derive a set of matching properties, compatible with the law, that characterizes the DA rule based on the designed choice rules. Our method provides a recipe for establishing such results and can help policymakers decide on which allocation rule to use in practice.
