论文标题
基于密文策略属性加密的数据查询
Data Querying with Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
论文作者
论文摘要
数据加密限制了查询的功率和效率。理想情况下应该可以直接处理加密数据，以避免需要进行数据解密，处理和重新吸收。保持数据可搜索和分类至关重要。也就是说，有意泄漏了一些信息。这种有意的泄漏技术被称为“对加密数据方案进行查询”，该方案提供了机密性以及对加密数据进行查询，但并不是要提供灵活的访问控制。本文建议使用基于密文策略属性加密（CP-ABE）来解决三个安全要求，即：机密性，对加密数据的查询以及灵活的访问控制。通过结合灵活的访问控制和数据机密性，CP-ABE可以验证谁可以访问数据并拥有秘密密钥。因此，本文确定了有多少数据泄漏，以确定当数据被CP-ABE加密时允许使用哪种操作。
Data encryption limits the power and efficiency of queries. Direct processing of encrypted data should ideally be possible to avoid the need for data decryption, processing, and re-encryption. It is vital to keep the data searchable and sortable. That is, some information is intentionally leaked. This intentional leakage technology is known as "querying over encrypted data schemes", which offer confidentiality as well as querying over encrypted data, but it is not meant to provide flexible access control. This paper suggests the use of Ciphertext Policy Attributes Based Encryption (CP-ABE) to address three security requirements, namely: confidentiality, queries over encrypted data, and flexible access control. By combining flexible access control and data confidentiality, CP-ABE can authenticate who can access data and possess the secret key. Thus, this paper identifies how much data leakage there is in order to figure out what kinds of operations are allowed when data is encrypted by CP-ABE.
