论文标题
独立于设备的无懈可击的加密
Device-independent uncloneable encryption
论文作者
论文摘要
Broadbent和Lord（TQC 2020）首先引入的无统治加密是一种量子加密方案，在该方案中，不能在两个非交流方之间分布量子密文，以至于鉴于对解密密钥的访问，双方都无法学习基础的明文。在这项工作中，我们介绍了一种不容易承担的加密变体，其中几个可能的解密密钥可以解密特定的加密，并且安全要求是，两个接收独立生成的解密密钥的当事方都不能同时了解基本的密码。我们表明，这种不可倾信的加密变体可以独立地实现，即不信任该方案中使用的量子状态和测量值，并且该变体在构建量子资金时的作用和原始定义一样。此外，我们表明，对我们方案的简单修改产生了一个单分解器加密方案，这是Georgiou和Zhandry引入的相关概念。特别是，所得的单分解器加密方案在对随机授权的标准定义方面实现了与设备无关的安全性。最后，我们为两种对流方案得出了一个“提取器”结果，该结果尤其是为单个比特膜提供的单分级加密方案，该方案可实现完美的反盗版安全性，而无需量子随机甲骨文模型。
Uncloneable encryption, first introduced by Broadbent and Lord (TQC 2020) is a quantum encryption scheme in which a quantum ciphertext cannot be distributed between two non-communicating parties such that, given access to the decryption key, both parties cannot learn the underlying plaintext. In this work, we introduce a variant of uncloneable encryption in which several possible decryption keys can decrypt a particular encryption, and the security requirement is that two parties who receive independently generated decryption keys cannot both learn the underlying ciphertext. We show that this variant of uncloneable encryption can be achieved device-independently, i.e., without trusting the quantum states and measurements used in the scheme, and that this variant works just as well as the original definition in constructing quantum money. Moreover, we show that a simple modification of our scheme yields a single-decryptor encryption scheme, which was a related notion introduced by Georgiou and Zhandry. In particular, the resulting single-decryptor encryption scheme achieves device-independent security with respect to a standard definition of security against random plaintexts. Finally, we derive an "extractor" result for a two-adversary scenario, which in particular yields a single-decryptor encryption scheme for single bit-messages that achieves perfect anti-piracy security without needing the quantum random oracle model.
