论文标题
设定临时截止日期以说服
Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade
论文作者
论文摘要
本金为多阶段项目提供资金，并保留削减资金的权利，如果它在某个时候停滞不前。代理商希望说服校长尽可能长时间为项目提供资金，并可以设计有关项目进度的信息流以说服校长。如果该项目足够有前途的前提，那么代理商承诺只提供完成该项目的好消息。如果该项目没有足够的前提，则代理商说服校长不仅承诺提供好消息，而且还要提供一个坏消息，即临时截止日期未达成一个项目里程碑。我证明，最佳信息披露的概述结构无疑是代理商的利润份额，资金流中受益以及共同折现率。
A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline. I demonstrate that the outlined structure of optimal information disclosure holds irrespective of the agent's profit share, benefit from the flow of funding, and the common discount rate.
