论文标题
具有位置不确定性的集体公共物品游戏
A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty
论文作者
论文摘要
我们对动态的公共贡献游戏进行了建模，其中玩家（自然地）分为组。这些组以序列外源性放置，玩家在序列中有关其组位置的信息有限。贡献决策是由玩家同时独立地做出的，并且依次做出了群体的总贡献。我们试图捕获间和组内行为，并分析玩家观察其前身群体总贡献的部分历史的不同情况。鉴于此框架，我们表明，即使玩家观察到叛逃的历史（没有贡献），也可以实现合作结果。在玩家只观察到他们的前任团体的贡献时，这一点尤其有趣，我们观察到玩家在激励他人做出贡献方面发挥了重要作用。
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute.
