论文标题
简约市场设计中的知情中立性：印度宪法危机的案例研究
Informed Neutrality in Minimalist Market Design: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India
论文作者
论文摘要
最高法院在以3-2的判决中，批准将印度的社会和经济落后阶层排除在其平权行动措施之外，以解决经济剥夺。包括印度首席大法官在内的反对大法官抗议了大多数人批准“公开排斥和歧视性原则”的意见。为了证明他们有争议的决定是合理的，大多数法官依靠明确错误的技术论点。法官的混乱是由于印度平权行动系统的微妙技术方面造成的：保护群体成员之间重叠的重要性。通常，受保护的类是由种姓制度确定的，这意味着它们没有重叠。除非人为执行，否则由经济标准定义的新受保护阶级的增加会改变这种结构。大多数法官未能理解这一批判性变化的重要性，并不准确地认为，有争议的排斥是为新班级以前未受保护的成员提供福利的技术必要性。我们表明，此案本可以通过三个避免有争议的排除的竞争政策解决。这些政策之一与多数意见中的核心论点相吻合，而第二个政策与反对意见中的核心论点保持一致。
In a 3-2 split verdict, the Supreme Court approved the exclusion of India's socially and economically backward classes from its affirmative action measures to address economic deprivation. Dissenting justices, including the Chief Justice of India, protested the Majority Opinion for sanctioning "an avowedly exclusionary and discriminatory principle." To justify their controversial decision, the majority justices relied on technical arguments that are categorically false. The confusion of the justices is due to a subtle technical aspect of the affirmative action system in India: the significance of overlaps between members of protected groups. Conventionally, protected classes were determined by the caste system, which meant they did not overlap. The addition of a new protected class defined by economic criteria alters this structure, unless it is artificially enforced. The majority justices failed to appreciate the significance of this critical change and inaccurately argued that the controversial exclusion is a technical necessity to provide benefits to previously unprotected members of a new class. We show that this case could have been resolved with three competing policies that each avoid the controversial exclusion. One of these policies aligns with the core arguments in the Majority Opinion, whereas a second aligns with those in the Dissenting Opinion.
