论文标题
明显的只有最高投票规则的操纵
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
论文作者
论文摘要
在一个有限的替代方案的投票问题中，我们研究了对最高规则的操纵。由于在有两个以上的替代方案并允许所有偏好时，都可以操纵所有非言语（进入）投票规则，因此我们寻找操作并不明显的规则。首先，我们表明规则没有明显的操作，并且仅当代理否决替代方案时，它可以以任何偏好在顶部没有此类替代方案的偏好。其次，我们专注于两类最高规则：（i）（概括）中位数选民计划，以及（ii）委员会投票。对于每个班级，我们确定哪些规则对偏好的通用领域没有明显的操纵。
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.
