论文标题
具有单峰偏好经济体的重新分配规则的可变人口操纵
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
在具有单峰偏好和个人捐赠的单商品经济中，我们研究了不同的方式，其中重新分配规则可以通过影响活跃代理的集合来策略性地扭曲。我们介绍并描述了单调重新分配规则的家族，并表明该类别中的每个规则都是防戒指和防捐赠的，至少一个是防捐赠的，并且没有这样的规则是预先交付的。
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of monotonic reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splitting-proof and that no such rule is pre-delivery-proof.
