论文标题
真实拍卖的多面部几何形状
The Polyhedral Geometry of Truthful Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
拍卖中结果的差异集是拍卖机制映射到结果的一组类型。我们给出了差异集的几何形状的完整表征，这些差异集可能会出现，这些差异集可能会出现占主导地位的兼容兼容的多单位拍卖，以表明它们与单位立方体的常规细分相对应。然后，该观察结果用于构建坚固的机制，从某种意义上说，分配给玩家的项目集仅在略微更改播放器的类型时才略有变化。
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference sets that can appear for a dominant strategy incentive compatible multi-unit auction showing that they correspond to regular subdivisions of the unit cube. This observation is then used to construct mechanisms that are robust in the sense that the set of items allocated to a player does change only slightly when the player's reported type is changed slightly.
