论文标题
通过模棱两可的语言协调
Coordination through ambiguous language
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提供相关平衡的句法结构。对于任何有限的游戏，我们研究玩家如何通过公共策略以某种自然语言表达的公共策略来协调他们的游戏。语言可能是模棱两可的，因为不同的参与者可以将不同的真实价值分配给世界同一状态的同一公式。我们使用Halpern和Kets（2015）的玩家依赖性逻辑对歧义进行建模。我们表明，没有任何歧义，自我强制的协调总是会引起基础游戏的相关平衡。当允许语言歧义时，自我强制协调策略会引起主观相关的平衡。
We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can be ambiguous in that different players may assign different truth values to the very same formula in the same state of the world. We model ambiguity using the player-dependent logic of Halpern and Kets (2015). We show that, absent any ambiguity, self-enforcing coordination always induces a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. When language ambiguity is allowed, self-enforcing coordination strategies induce subjective correlated equilibria.
