论文标题
关于囚犯困境不同计划平衡的兼容性的注释
A Note on the Compatibility of Different Robust Program Equilibria of the Prisoner's Dilemma
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了囚犯困境的程序游戏版本，即，每个玩家都提交计算机程序，将程序访问彼此的源代码，然后选择是合作还是缺陷。先前的工作已经引入了各种计划，这些程序在此游戏中构成了对自己的平衡。例如，$ε$的公平机器人与概率$ε$合作，其余概率运行其对手的程序并复制其动作。如果两个玩家都提交此程序，那么这是NASH平衡，两个玩家都合作。其他人则根据基于证明的公平机器人提出了合作均衡，如果他们能证明对手合作（另外），他们是否可以合作。我们在这里表明这些不同的程序彼此兼容。例如，如果一位玩家提交$ε$的公平机器人，另一个玩家提交了一个基于证明的公平机器人，那么这也是囚犯困境的程序游戏版本的合作均衡。
We study a program game version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, i.e., a two-player game in which each player submits a computer program, the programs are given read access to each other's source code and then choose whether to cooperate or defect. Prior work has introduced various programs that form cooperative equilibria against themselves in this game. For example, the $ε$-grounded Fair Bot cooperates with probability $ε$ and with the remaining probability runs its opponent's program and copies its action. If both players submit this program, then this is a Nash equilibrium in which both players cooperate. Others have proposed cooperative equilibria based on proof-based Fair Bots, which cooperate if they can prove that the opponent cooperates (and defect otherwise). We here show that these different programs are compatible with each other. For example, if one player submits $ε$-grounded Fair Bot and the other submits a proof-based Fair Bot, then this is also a cooperative equilibrium of the program game version of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
