论文标题
符号策略人口游戏的无限视野
Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game
论文作者
论文摘要
为了预测时间游戏的行为，时间很长，表征我们游戏动态演变的过程必须是可逆的。满足这两个策略游戏的已知游戏以及具有指数协议的潜在游戏。我们将尝试扩展对所谓的符号策略游戏的无限视野的研究。
To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games.
