论文标题
在灵活的代表民主中奔波
Pandering in a Flexible Representative Democracy
论文作者
论文摘要
在代表民主国家中，在定期选举周期中选举新代表的目的是为了防止民选官员的腐败和其他不当行为的行为，并使他们对``人民的意愿''的``人民意愿''负责。当候选人在竞选这些多个周期或单身行动时，候选人在竞选活动中不诚实时可能会受到损害。介绍\ emph {pandering}的新型模型，或者是寻求当选的候选人的战略偏好报告，并研究两个民主投票系统在单个回合中和多个投票系统中的复杂性，我们将统一的策略（frd contresties contranties contranties contranties contristion contimentions）。他们对候选人的看法是根据过去的方式，我们在单个周期中为pandering的复杂性提供了理论上的结果，为多个周期作为马尔可夫决策过程，并利用加强学习来研究跨许多圆形候选人的候选人和候选人组的效果。
In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep them accountable in service of the ``will of the people." This democratic ideal can be undermined when candidates are dishonest when campaigning for election over these multiple cycles or rounds of voting. Much of the work on COMSOC to date has investigated strategic actions in only a single round. We introduce a novel formal model of \emph{pandering}, or strategic preference reporting by candidates seeking to be elected, and examine the resilience of two democratic voting systems to pandering within a single round and across multiple rounds. The two voting systems we compare are Representative Democracy (RD) and Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD). For each voting system, our analysis centers on the types of strategies candidates employ and how voters update their views of candidates based on how the candidates have pandered in the past. We provide theoretical results on the complexity of pandering in our setting for a single cycle, formulate our problem for multiple cycles as a Markov Decision Process, and use reinforcement learning to study the effects of pandering by both single candidates and groups of candidates across a number of rounds.
