论文标题
用户比看起来更近：保护用户位置免受WiFi APS
Users are Closer than they Appear: Protecting User Location from WiFi APs
论文作者
论文摘要
基于WiFi的室内本地化已经成熟了十多年。当前的大多数本地化算法都依赖于企业网络中的WiFi访问点（APS）来准确本地化WiFi用户。因此，通过受损的WiFi AP聆听攻击者可以轻松地窥探WiFi用户的位置信息。由于室内本地化和导航是迈向自动化的下一步，因此重要的是让用户能够防御此类攻击。在本文中，我们提出了Mirage，该系统可以利用下行链路物理层信息来为攻击者在WiFi用户的位置信息上窃取攻击者。 Mirage通过利用已经是WiFi协议的一部分的发射器的光束成型能力来实现这一目标。有了这个最初的想法，我们已经证明了用户可以将其位置从WiFi AP掺杂，始终没有妥协到现有的WiFi通信系统的吞吐量，并将攻击者的用户位置精度从2300万降低到1000万以上。
WiFi-based indoor localization has now matured for over a decade. Most of the current localization algorithms rely on the WiFi access points (APs) in the enterprise network to localize the WiFi user accurately. Thus, the WiFi user's location information could be easily snooped by an attacker listening through a compromised WiFi AP. With indoor localization and navigation being the next step towards automation, it is important to give users the capability to defend against such attacks. In this paper, we present MIRAGE, a system that can utilize the downlink physical layer information to create a defense against an attacker snooping on a WiFi user's location information. MIRAGE achieves this by utilizing the beamforming capability of the transmitter that is already part of the WiFi protocols. With this initial idea, we have demonstrated that the user can obfuscate his/her location from the WiFi AP always with no compromise to the throughput of the existing WiFi communication system and reduce the user location accuracy of the attacker from 2.3m to more than 10m.
