论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation
论文作者
论文摘要
储层计算是预测湍流的有力工具，其简单的架构具有处理大型系统的计算效率。然而，其实现通常需要完整的状态向量测量和系统非线性知识。我们使用非线性投影函数将系统测量扩展到高维空间，然后将其输入到储层中以获得预测。我们展示了这种储层计算网络在时空混沌系统上的应用，该系统模拟了湍流的若干特征。我们表明，使用径向基函数作为非线性投影器，即使只有部分观测并且不知道控制方程，也能稳健地捕捉复杂的系统非线性。最后，我们表明，当测量稀疏、不完整且带有噪声，甚至控制方程变得不准确时，我们的网络仍然可以产生相当准确的预测，从而为实际湍流系统的无模型预测铺平了道路。
Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project CC, researchers propose to provide refunds to incentivize agents to contribute, thereby guaranteeing the project's funding. These funding guarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This work focuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available for CC and agents have a limited budget. We study certain specific conditions where funding can be guaranteed. Further, funding the optimal social welfare subset of projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due to budget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare at equilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. We then study different heuristics that the agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. Through simulations, we demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-case trade-off between welfare obtained and agent utility.
