论文标题
通过奖励最弱的成员来激励合作
Incentivising cooperation by rewarding the weakest member
论文作者
论文摘要
在许多社会领域(例如客户服务,运输和医疗保健)中,代表人类行事的自主代理人变得越来越普遍。在这样的社交情况下,贪婪的策略可以减少所有代理商的积极结果,例如导致高速公路上的停留交通,或在通信渠道上拒绝服务。取而代之的是,我们希望自主决策能够进行有效的绩效,同时还考虑了小组的公平性避免这些陷阱。不幸的是,在复杂的情况下,为自私策略设计机器学习目标要比公平行为容易得多。在这里,我们提出了一种简单的方法,可以通过最弱的成员的表现来奖励进化和强化学习领域的代理团体。我们展示了这如何产生``更公平''更公平的行为,同时也最大程度地提高了个人成果,并且我们展示了与小组级选择和包容性健身理论的生物选择机制的关系。
Autonomous agents that act with each other on behalf of humans are becoming more common in many social domains, such as customer service, transportation, and health care. In such social situations greedy strategies can reduce the positive outcome for all agents, such as leading to stop-and-go traffic on highways, or causing a denial of service on a communications channel. Instead, we desire autonomous decision-making for efficient performance while also considering equitability of the group to avoid these pitfalls. Unfortunately, in complex situations it is far easier to design machine learning objectives for selfish strategies than for equitable behaviors. Here we present a simple way to reward groups of agents in both evolution and reinforcement learning domains by the performance of their weakest member. We show how this yields ``fairer'' more equitable behavior, while also maximizing individual outcomes, and we show the relationship to biological selection mechanisms of group-level selection and inclusive fitness theory.