论文标题
配对友好的椭圆曲线：重新访问分类法，攻击和安全问题
Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves: Revisited Taxonomy, Attacks and Security Concern
论文作者
论文摘要
包括BN，BLS12，BLS24，KSS16和KSS18在内的配对友好椭圆形曲线的主要家庭很容易受到数字菲尔德筛（NFS）攻击的影响。由于最近对F_（Q^K）中离散日志的攻击，选择此类曲线再次变得相关。本文重新审视了在不同安全级别选择配对友好曲线的主题。首先，我们扩展了Freeman等人给出的分类。 [1]通过识别以前未提及的新家庭，例如一个具有可变差异化的完整家庭和新稀疏的曲线家族。我们讨论了单个曲线和构建参数家庭的综合框架。我们估计了对配对友好曲线的安全性和评估的家庭，以比BN，KSS和BLS更好地发现曲线的家庭。除了Barbulescu等人之外，我们还评估了以前从未讨论过的最佳ATE配对的复杂性。 [2]。我们证明了最近对配对的攻击（TNF）需要增加关键大小。我们比较了关键大小的曲线家族，并选择了椭圆曲线的合适替代品。
Major families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, including BN, BLS12, BLS24, KSS16, and KSS18 have recently been vulnerable to number field sieve (NFS) attacks. Due to the recent attacks on discrete logs in F_(q^k ), selecting such curves became relevant again. This paper revisited the topic of selecting pairing-friendly curves at different security levels. First, we expanded the classification given by Freeman et al. [1] by identifying new families that were not previously mentioned, such as a complete family with variable differentiation and new sparse families of curves. We discussed individual curves and a comprehensive framework for constructing parametric families. We estimated the security and assessed families of the pairing-friendly curve to discover families of curves better than BN, KSS, and BLS in terms of the required key size. We also evaluated the complexity of the optimal ate pairing that has never been discussed before, except by Barbulescu et al. [2]. We demonstrated that the recent attack (TNFS) on pairing needs to increase the key size. We compared families of curves in the context of key size and selected a suitable alternative to an elliptic curve.
