论文标题
与不完整的首选项匹配
Matching with Incomplete Preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了一个双面婚姻市场，在该市场中，代理商有不完整的偏好 - 即，他们发现了一些无与伦比的替代方案。强大的（弱）核心由比赛组成，其中没有一个联盟希望在他们之间形成新的比赛，使某些（所有）代理商更好，而不会伤害任何人。强芯可能是空的，而弱核可能太大了。我提出了“妥协核心”的概念，这是一个位于弱小核心和强大核心之间的非空置集。同样，我定义了男性（女性）最佳核心，并说明了其在印度工程学院招生系统中的应用中的好处。
I study a two-sided marriage market in which agents have incomplete preferences -- i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between themselves, leaving some (all) agents better off without harming anyone. The strong core may be empty, while the weak core can be too large. I propose the concept of the "compromise core" -- a nonempty set that sits between the weak and the strong cores. Similarly, I define the men-(women-) optimal core and illustrate its benefit in an application to India's engineering college admissions system.
