论文标题
有限的套利和几乎理性的行为
Bounded arbitrage and nearly rational behavior
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在几乎缺乏套利机会的原则与几乎理性的决策之间建立了等价。这种原则的含义是在概率观点和随机选择函数的汇总的背景下考虑的。在前者中，有限制的套利原理及其等效形式作为大约帕累托条件，显示出一组状态的集体概率评估与单个评估的线性聚合规则之间的差异。在后者中，我们表明，我们的有限套利机会的一般原则转化为随机理性的McFadden-Richter richter公理的削弱，并为随机选择函数的最小距离提供了在随机效用最大化模型类别中的另一个中的最小距离。
We establish the equivalence between a principle of almost absence of arbitrage opportunities and nearly rational decision-making. The implications of such principle are considered in the context of the aggregation of probabilistic opinions and of stochastic choice functions. In the former a bounded arbitrage principle and its equivalent form as an approximately Pareto condition are shown to bound the difference between the collective probabilistic assessment of a set of states and a linear aggregation rule on the individual assessments. In the latter we show that our general principle of limited arbitrage opportunities translates into a weakening of the McFadden-Richter axiom of stochastic rationality, and gives an upper bound for the minimum distance of a stochastic choice function to another in the class of random utility maximization models.
