论文标题
不可分割商品的最大纳什福利的表征
A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goods
论文作者
论文摘要
在不可分割的商品分配中，选择最大化代理商公用事业产品的分配的最大纳什福利（MNW）规则已因其公平性而受到了极大的关注。我们将MNW描述为唯一满足嫉妒性的额外福利主义规则。即使在两个代理的最简单设置中，我们的表征也存在。
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness. We characterize MNW as the only additive welfarist rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. Our characterization holds even in the simplest setting of two agents.
