论文标题
解决方案合作游戏概念的近似
Approximations of solution concepts of cooperative games
论文作者
论文摘要
合作游戏的解决方案概念的计算通常取决于所有联盟的价值。但是，在某些应用中，由于各种原因，某些联盟的值可能未知。我们引入了一种方法，以近似于标准解决方案概念，仅基于所谓的不完整游戏给出的部分信息。我们演示了最小游戏的类别的想法。针对包括沙普利值，核仁或核心在内的不同溶液概念得出近似值。我们展示了一些解决方案概念的近似值的明确公式，并显示了基于有关游戏的其他信息的近似性有何不同。
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to approximate standard solution concepts based only on partial information given by a so called incomplete game. We demonstrate the ideas on the class of minimal incomplete games. Approximations are derived for different solution concepts including the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the core. We show explicit formulas for approximations of some of the solution concepts and show how the approximability differs based on additional information about the game.
