论文标题
理性水平对二次成本的异质欧文族人双重垄断主义者动态的影响
Influence of rationality levels on dynamics of heterogeneous Cournot duopolists with quadratic costs
论文作者
论文摘要
本文旨在调查异质的杜尔诺特·肖普利特（Cournot Doopoly Games）的动态，第一批玩家采用了相同的梯度调整机制，但第二名玩家赋予了独特的理性水平。基于符号计算的工具，我们引入了一种新方法，并使用它来为这些模型建立局部稳定性的严格条件。我们通过分析研究分叉，并证明倍增分叉是所有考虑的模型可能发生的唯一可能发生的分叉。我们研究的最重要发现是关于参与者的理性水平对异质双重垄断竞争稳定性的影响。得出的是，第二家公司是最小的模型的稳定区域，而第二家公司的稳定区域是最大的。这一事实是违反直觉的，与现有文献中的相对结论形成了鲜明对比。此外，我们还提供数值模拟，以证明复杂动力学的出现，例如具有不同阶和奇怪吸引子的周期性解决方案。
This paper is intended to investigate the dynamics of heterogeneous Cournot duopoly games, where the first players adopt identical gradient adjustment mechanisms but the second players are endowed with distinct rationality levels. Based on tools of symbolic computations, we introduce a new approach and use it to establish rigorous conditions of the local stability for these models. We analytically investigate the bifurcations and prove that the period-doubling bifurcation is the only possible bifurcation that may occur for all the considered models. The most important finding of our study is regarding the influence of players' rational levels on the stability of heterogeneous duopolistic competition. It is derived that the stability region of the model where the second firm is rational is the smallest, while that of the one where the second firm is boundedly rational is the largest. This fact is counterintuitive and contrasts with relative conclusions in the existing literature. Furthermore, we also provide numerical simulations to demonstrate the emergence of complex dynamics such as periodic solutions with different orders and strange attractors.
